By W.F. Vallicella
The middle of philosophy is metaphysics, and on the middle of the guts lie questions about life. what's it for any contingent factor to exist? Why does any contingent factor exist? name those the character query and the floor query, respectively. the 1st matters the character of the life of the contingent existent; the second one issues the floor of the contingent existent. either questions are historical, and but perennial of their attraction; either have presided over the burial of such a lot of in their would-be undertakers that it's a sturdy induction that they're going to proceed to take action. For it slow now, the popular variety in addressing such questions has been deflationary while it has now not been eliminativist. Ask Willard Quine what lifestyles is, and you may listen that "Existence is what existential quantification expresses. "! Ask Bertrand Russell what it's for a person to exist, and he'll let you know that anyone can not more exist than it may be a number of: there 2 simply is not any such factor because the life of people. and naturally Russell's eliminativist resolution signifies that one can't even ask, on discomfort of succumbing to the fallacy of advanced query, why any contingent person exists: if no person exists, there should be absolute confidence why anybody exists. let alone Russell's modal corollary: 'contingent' and 'necessary' can merely be acknowledged de dicto (of propositions) and never de re (of things).
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Additional info for A Paradigm Theory of Existence: Onto-Theology Vindicated
The natural answer is that the incompleteness or finitude of the perceptual object is brought about by the finitude of the knowing subject, or perhaps the finitude essential to perceptual consciousness as such. IS EXISTENCE A FIRST-LEVEL PROPERTY? 41 Accordingly, it is not that there are incomplete and mind-independent actual items; it is rather that there are incomplete perceptual takings of complete mindindependent actual things. Thus the finitude of the intentional object of my present perceiving would be due to the finitude of consciousness, and not due to some intrinsic finitude in mind-independent items.
We don't think them up, we somehow apprehend them. They mayor may not acquire what he calls the "pseudo-existence" of being actually thought about by some mind. The problem is not how one can hold before one's mind a pure essence in abstraction from existence, for nonexistent items are not engendered by abstraction. The problem is how a pure essence can both mind-independently be and yet be beingless. How can the golden mountain, the round square, Pegasus, Cerberus and other possibilia and impossibilia be independent of anyone's thinking and yet be beingless?
But nothing propositionally alethic ('alethic' for short) can serve as an ultimate truth-maker either. Thus no atomic proposition can be made true by another true proposition. Since an ultimate truth-maker cannot be either sub-alethic or alethic, it must be super-alethic. Facts are superalethic in that their obtaining transmits truth to propositions at the same time that this obtaining is more ontologically basic than propositional truth. To put it another way, a fact, as a truth-maker, cannot lack truth the wayan individual, property, set, sum or pair lacks truth; but neither can a fact be true in the way a proposition is true.
A Paradigm Theory of Existence: Onto-Theology Vindicated by W.F. Vallicella